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1. Introduction 
“Never forget that everything Hitler did in Germany was legal.” 
Martin Luther King 
 
Legal positivism suggests that law, although being influenced by its social environment, is able to 
generate itself. Such a strong belief in law is broken at critical times. Following the cataclysm of the 
Nazi dictatorship or the holocaust, it was inevitable to come back to the non-legal fundamentals of 
civilisation. This way, law should be established on the basic value of human dignity, the protection 
of which is to be ensured without regard to how the state power operates.  
Law may be subordinated to meta-juridical values in different ways. For example, Martin Luther 
King stood up for the equal treatment of citizens, no matter whether they were black or white. The 
choice of equal treatment should exceed the various options of interpreting law. Populist political 
systems are infamous for subduing law to political will. Quite similarly, unorthodox policies 
identify themselves that they are engaged in taking targeted measures at the time when conventional 
methods do not promise success. They do not continue to adhere to accepted norms. Instead, they 
seek to comply with values that are said to be more important than the alleged legal sophism.  
In the following, legal unorthodoxy will be dealt with. The main idea is to study the so-called 
unorthodox taxes Hungary has adopted in the recent years. The study of unorthodox taxes should be 
preceded by the more general discussion of how law is made under unorthodoxy, and what are the 
special features of unorthodox legal policy. The present paper concerns this broader subject.  
 
2. A theoretical framework for unorthodoxy in economic policy and legislation  
Unorthodoxy is manifested in various policy fields. In legal policy, unorthodoxy badly affects the 
quality of legislation. Populism enhances the problems in handling the constitutional values of 
equality and the rule of law. In the following part, the paper seeks to clarify what are the main 
features of the policy courses of unorthodoxy and populism. Particular regard will be given to legal 
developments. Unorthodox law will also be illustrated by the examples of special industry levies.  
 
2.1. Criticism of industrial societies and the performance of mass economies  
Jürgen Habermas discovered the legitimacy crisis of late capitalism in the seventies of the last 
century. Already at this time he noted as crisis phenomena the disturbance of ecological balance, 
alienation and the explosive strain in international relations (Habermas 1995).1 He argues that in 
these circumstances, it is not sufficient just to rely on the operation of the macro structures of 
society (on the organisation of social production and the centralisation of income) to achieve 
stability and cohesion in society. It is also important to acknowledge that physical place cannot be 
filled unless social space is evolved from time to time through the interactions of small groups 
affected in particular situations. Agents are distributed in the social space not only according to the 
overall volume of (economic, cultural, social and symbolic) capital they hold but, more importantly, 
also according to the relative weight of the different species of capital, as Bourdieu (1989) asserts.  
In a world where the medium is message and social practice is proliferated in different layers of 
virtuality, mechanisms are active that can be interpreted by a growing tension which can be 
assumed between the aspects of social and systemic integration. In everyday life, informal 
communities operate due to bargaining and compromises, deliberation and orientation to coherence 
1 “The resource of ‘value’, siphoned off by the tax office, has to make up for the scanty resource of ‘meaning’. Missing 
legitimations have to be replaced by social rewards such as money, time and security” (Habermass 1995: 154). 
                                                 
in values. In parallel to this, subsystems are also developed. In an analytic point of view, stability in 
social practice can be highlighted with regard to the interaction between a system and its 
environment. An empirically ascertainable connection exists between the principle of differentiation 
of social systems and the form, in which subsystems differentiate themselves in society, being self-
referentially closed, and open to their environment (Luhmann 1988). In late functionalist sociology, 
what is causal will be replaced by what is structural.  
In the traditional state-society interaction, the so-called state consent model of legitimacy was the 
foundation of the recognition of law and legislation. Law was supposed to be legitimate since it was 
(explicitly or implicitly) consented by the (democratically elected) representative bodies of people. 
In a changing state-society interaction, the traditional explanation of law does not seem to be 
sufficient. The official policy does not address people as long as it is not able to make impersonal 
relationships into personal. It is only able to take effect if it intrudes on private life. In this process, 
the borderline between privacy and public life is blurred.  
Unorthodoxy is a product of the above mentioned social changes. It may assume policies that are 
not established on the standards of the rule of law and representative democracy. They are more 
personal, and private rather than public in nature. Unorthodoxy arises from the criticism of the 
performance of unarticulated common needs of industrial societies. The criticism of mass societies 
also leads to scepticism about modernity, and, learning from Ortega and Nietzsche, negation of the 
equality before the law principle.  
Unorthodoxy appears first of all as economic policy. Under unorthodox economic policy, it is 
crucial to meet the basic needs of a large number of consumer households. To do that, it is not 
possible just to rely on the simple logic of being economic with scarce resources, because the 
aspirations of consumer households are complex. It is inevitable to involve public sources in 
meeting these complex needs on a large scale. Furthermore, unorthodox economic policy assumes 
the function of balancing between the needs of consumer households and the households of 
enterprises. This is inescapable again for lack of integrity in the relationship between consumers 
and enterprises, driven by the laws of market economy (Kopátsy 1995).  
Unorthodox economic policy does not bother a lot about the development of human infrastructure 
and public institutions (schools, hospitals, institutions of social care, etc.). It is eager, however, to 
secure an acceptable standard of living for the families of ordinary people, for example, by freezing 
the energy prices private households have to pay. This policy does not place much stress on public 
institutions. It is vigilant, however, in assisting people in preserving what they have acquired for 
their private household. In general, people are appreciated if they are able to acquire financial 
means to meet private needs, and people are neglected who are not successful in this business for 
any reason.  
Political power consists of the amalgam of people connected to each other like in confraternity, or 
rather clanship. The middle class, the position of which is maintained by administrative means 
fiercely resist any connection both with the poor who are not able to acquire goods, and foreign 
investors, with which they would not be able to keep pace in free competition.  
After the time of mass societies, the mechanism of market demand and supply may fail to operate 
because needs are complex and unpredictable. Sales are not possible unless detailed offers are not 
agreed in advance. Relational goods emerge that can only be sold, taking into account the personal 
aspirations of those to whom products are addressed. Unorthodox economic policy seeks to improve 
the mechanisms of offer and acceptance by orienting private households of their chances (Kopátsy 
1995: 66-67). Under these circumstances, economic efficiency will be superseded by the common 
will, as interpreted by the state.  
It is a fundamental consequence of the operation of unorthodox policy that the material 
determination of justice prevails over legal formalities. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to 
do quality legislation. To be worse, every-day life experience is imbued with political explanations 
that are far from any theoretical consideration. Then, legal hypotheses will also be depreciated. 
Impersonal legal mechanisms and sound law-making are debilitated by messianic or arbitrary 
views. The rule of law cannot be recognised in a field of irrational political decisions.  
Where the state is engaged in transferring economic and non-economic resources among 
households, maintaining a high level of centralisation, laws are frequently tailored up to the 
individual positions of companies or groups of persons, legislation may be captured by lobby-
groups, and there is no room for the enforcement of legal principles. Democratic procedures and 
fair trial are oppressed by the administration of justice addressed to individuals. As laws are 
adjusted to every-day targets, legal certainty will also be undermined.  
 
2.2. Populism  
The political environment of populism can be characterised by the following (Laclau 2005):  
- the language of public discourse is of paradigmatic, rather than of syntagmatic nature, i.e., 
political declarations are attractive rather than systematic;  
- the holders of political power seek to present the politically organised space as a whole, as if 
it were equivalent with the political will as reflected by the major groups of society; and  
- political power itself is able to generate ideological contents independently; so, what is 
representing may prevail over what is represented.  
The social environment of populism can be characterised as follows (Neumann 1949):  
- populism provides the promise of getting easy access to material goods; this is a message 
contrary to be ascetic; in the light of the latter, people renounce consuming the goods that 
can be adjudged as evil in a process where suffering is manifested as reasonable and the 
individual, refraining himself or herself from action can be glorified and spiritualised;  
- the individual is pathologically inflated, and the empty space left due to the disrespect of 
professional values is replaced by authority, or even force;  
- repression comes to the fore that produces waste, the removal of which is only possible by 
the assumption of conflicts, and showing up scapegoats and fabricating conspiracies;  
- no space is left for ethics; morality can be replaced by Darwinism, and legal regulation by 
voluntarism; and  
- the possibility of social regulation is constrained (Freud 1921) by the facts that people who 
are hypnotised or neurotic in a crowd lose their judgment and morality, and they can be 
pathologically subordinated to their leaders, losing their sensibility to innovation.  
A populist state seeks to invoke people directly, not refraining itself from entering the spheres that 
have been left before in intimateness. Populist politicians may organise by political force civil 
circles, elaborate the systems of the so-called national cooperation, attacking people by junk letters 
and bogus questionnaires, etc. The only function of these actions is to deepen the feelings of being 
identical with the distinct political power, undermining representative democracy. In the economic 
policy, a populist state prefers to apply the so-called unorthodox means. Examples include: 
preferential treatment of manufacturing to services, and even to the knowledge-based society, 
initiating so-called strategic agreements with selected big corporations, the use of the monetary 
reserves for financing targeted aid measures, the introduction of special and luxury taxes, etc.  
 
2.3. Regional and Hungarian issues  
The above-mentioned reasons for unorthodoxy are present everywhere in current times. Ill 
performance of mass societies is clearly visible. In the region of Central and Eastern Europe, the 
problems of bad operation are even more apparent. This is due to the historic problems of transition 
into modernism. Unorthodoxy is usually the product of social malpractice. It is characteristic for the 
region that all the processes of modernisation started as in Western Europe. However, most of them 
have not been completed. Therefore, one can conclude that here it is not a bourgeoisie that has 
organically developed, but a type of semi-bourgeois has appeared that by and large lacks autonomy 
in his or her course of actions.  
The representatives of the lower middle class have been the victim of the change from progressive 
to proportional income tax. Local governments have been deprived of autonomy, public schools and 
hospitals have been centralised. It is a major barrier to competition that one cannot be successful 
without developing a nexus with politicians. This is true for public procurement, for applications to 
rent public land, or for getting licenses to operate monopolies (Kis 2013).  
Populist policy means consumerism, converting citizens into common people. It also means 
paternalism in society and voluntarism in policies. Reference to patriotism is enhanced, justice can 
be promulgated, but it cannot be discussed. Political competitors are stigmatised, demagogy 
becomes systemic, and the separation between the state and church is challenged (Ripp 2006). The 
buzzwords to be followed are resistance, preservation of ancient values, circumvention of law and 
avoidance of taxes. The alternatives of them would be: proactivity and deliberate actions, 
adaptation, catching up, balancing, progression. They are less popular, however (Csizmadia 2010). 
Unorthodoxy is an alternative to modernisation. It is viable in a system of managed capitalism 
(Tölgyessy 2013).  
Special industry levies have been introduced in Hungary without previous negotiations and 
agreements with the various groups of interest. To be worse, special taxes were introduced in the 
autumn of 2010 with a retroactive effect to the beginning of the fiscal year. The democratic control 
of citizens was missing. Even if the distribution of the public burden to be incurred was negotiated 
with the participants of some special industries subsequently, the Hungarian government failed to 
respect agreements (e.g., that was the case with the agreement made, and broken, by the 
government in December 2011 with the Hungarian Bankers’ Association).  
Hungary has been a model country of fiscal populism since 2010 (a country that is no longer 
officially called as the Republic of Hungary). The Hungarian prime minister described the 
economic and fiscal policy of his country by the words as follows (Orbán 2011):  
- share in the public burden: in the light of this buzzword, the principles of equality and legal 
certainty that would normally underlie the general share in the public burden can be 
loosened; examples for this are the withdrawal of the savings of private pension funds, the 
application of crisis taxes, or the introduction by force of the subsequent final repayment of 
mortgage loans and the foreign exchange rates on mortgage loans, fixed by the state below 
the market rates;  
- corroboration: the addressee of this measure are the groups of the middle class selected by 
the government who are the beneficiaries of the proportional income tax replacing the 
progression in income tax; and  
- economic restructuring: it relates to reduction in public debt, and suggests that the 
Hungarian state is interested in tax and regulatory competition, and disinterested in 
European tax harmonisation.  
As the Hungarian prime minister explains, Europe is in crisis, and the time of crisis requires special 
measures to take. This is why targeted actions are preferred to legal certainty (Fehér 2013). In 
general, under populism, fiscal discipline is superseded by pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy 
(Kopits, 2001).2  
 
2 George Kopits reported that in the first decade of the current century, both developed countries and emerging 
economies followed by and large fiscal discipline. Pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy was characteristic in the 70s 
of the 20th century.  
                                                 
2.4. An example for unorthodoxy: special industry levies  
Special industry levies have proliferated in the recent years in some countries. Hungary is eminent 
in introducing such levies. Examples are: bank levy, financial transaction duty, telecom tax, special 
tax on energy suppliers, pharmaceuticals’ contribution, and retail store tax.  
Some considerations can be taken into account as to how much the application of special industry 
levies is reasonable:  
- during an economic crisis, both the responsibility and the elbowroom of public intervention 
is increased;  
- it is just and fair to apply levies on windfall gains if any; and  
- special levies, being para-fiscal charges, are different from taxes due to the link established 
between payment and services, the dedication of revenue to particular goals, and the close 
link between tax and non-tax means of public intervention.  
Furthermore:  
- fiscal discipline could be superseded by pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy that is 
manifested in the unorthodox fiscal measures like the application of tax amnesty, 
confiscatory taxes, crisis taxes or Robin Hood taxes;  
- targeted actions are preferred to legal certainty; and  
- preferential treatment of manufacturing to services, and even to the knowledge-based 
society, is increasingly common, initiatives of so-called strategic agreements with selected 
big corporations, or the use of the monetary reserves for financing targeted aid measures can 
also be noticed.  
- the principle of the general share in the public burden is adjusted under the umbrella of 
corporatism, according to which the liability to pay in favour of the public budget is 
determined in proportion to the social responsibility of corporate bodies; and  
- the state is eager to arrange for the allocation of privileges among the selected players of the 
national economy, rather than to contribute to strengthening the principles of equality before 
law, fair treatment and effectiveness in the protection of citizens’ rights.  
Special industry levies can be indicated as Robin Hood taxes, considered as a means of restricting 
human behaviour, which cannot be accepted socially, or which can be reprimanded. A function of 
administering justice is frequently imputed to special industry levies. As the administration of such 
justice always lacks a sound basis, the introduction of Robin Hood taxes usually divides society.  
It seems to be precluded that the methods of robbery could be ethically justified, even if they are 
popular. To illustrate this, one can see the story of Karl Moor as recounted by Friedrich Schiller, or 
that of Michael Kohlhaas narrated by Heinrich von Kleist. For the purposes of the rule of law 
principle, it is of particular danger if the state tolerates, or even furthers the application of the 
principle of “fiat iustitia, et pereat mundus”.  
It is a major problem in Hungary that no plan was prepared for compensation to be made in 
exchange for the payment of tax. For example, in other countries, the revenues collected from a 
bank levy go for special funds to support the development and secure operation of banks. Another 
example: the revenue gained from a Robin Hood tax that is imposed on energy suppliers can be 
used to finance the research for alternative sources of energy. In Hungary, special industry levies 
simply meet the appetite of the state budget. An indication of special industry levies lacking 
justification is that the Government itself considers them as provisional.  
Hence, the Government that introduces special industry levies renounces justifying its policy. 
Justification would be possible only if there were clear plans for what purpose the revenue collected 
from these levies can be used, and a clear link would be created between the liability to pay and the 
public services to be provided in exchange for payment. It would thus be required to determine 
needs before the democratic public and conduct plans for the benefit to be expected from the public 
investment.  
It is a further problem that since the revenue to be collected from special industry levies is planned 
as provisional, the state budget that relies on it does not seem to be tenable. This is the main reason 
why at the time the special industry levies were introduced, a crisis of confidence developed 
between the Hungarian government and the European Commission concerning the credibility of the 
Hungarian state budget’s estimates. Alternatively, were the special taxes not phased out – as there 
are hints at that – fiscal policy would retard investments and, this way, economic growth, and 
distort economic decisions. Under such circumstances, it is decisive for success how it is possible 
for companies to gain access to public resources and orders what would then depart the economic 
behaviour from free competition, and market-oriented rationality withers away.  
Special industry levies seem to undermine not only the principle of legitimate expectations, but they 
also contribute to the implementation of creeping expropriation. However, international law 
prohibits expropriation if the final result of the state policy is to deteriorate the domestic conditions 
of foreign investors. Erosion of legal certainty may also lead to the violation of ownership, not to 
mention about stifling entrepreneurship.  
While special industry levies are introduced, the liability to pay tax depends on the position the 
taxpayer holds in the national economy that can significantly be influenced by the state itself. Under 
such circumstances, it is not only the principle of proportionality of taxation can be suspended, but 
also the principle that taxation should take place according to the ability-to-pay. In case of special 
industry levies, it is not possible to compare with each other citizens on a horizontal axis, based on 
their financial capabilities because the state isolates from each other particular groups of citizens 
and enterprises, depending on particular positions they hold.  
As a consequence, it is impossible to enforce not only fiscal neutrality, but also democratic control. 
Breaking neutrality also ensures that the state, while it claims to have wide control over resources, 
gives up being impartial. It will thus support selected companies and groups, introduce levies on 
particular branches, and it will be busy with centralisation, distribution and redistribution.  
For lack of the methods of measuring social needs in conformity with the laws of a market 
economy, it is only possible to make a broad assessment of the volume of state responsibility, and 
the public revenue the state seeks to collect through the introduction of special industry levies. 
Special levies appear quite frequently as lump-sum taxes because no tax base could be determined 
exactly in monetary terms. Special industry levies may also be like poll taxes, which means that the 
same burden is imposed on each household, irrespective of the taxpayer’s ability-to-pay. The effect 
of this however is a fierce regression in taxation.  
 
3. Standards of orthodoxy in legislation  
Unorthodoxy can be determined as everything that is not orthodox. It can thus be characterised by 
means of describing orthodoxy. In the light of orthodoxy, it is reasonable to summarise the formal 
criteria, according to which legislation can be assessed in general. They are closely related to the 
notion of legal certainty. Once the standards of the rule of law and legal certainty are met, one can 
conclude that all is right with legislation. Legislation can thus be held as orthodox.  
Formality of law can be discussed from different approaches (i.e., from the angle of legal 
positivism, natural law, or from other doctrines). This paper is not concerned with systematising the 
rule of law issue. Its only purpose is to highlight the features of orthodoxy in legislation. In this 
respect, the arguments delivered from different theoretical views may lead to the same conclusion, 
according to which it can be clarified what is unorthodoxy and unorthodoxy in legislation and legal 
policy. It will then be possible to compare the practice of unorthodox legislation to the standards of 
orthodoxy. This is what is discussed below.  
 
3.1. Rule of law and legal certainty  
Rule of law emerges where political power is divided among several branches and the source of 
political power is the law (Carothers 1998; Mayhew 1968; Long 1968; Dicey 1964; Leibholz 1977). 
The hard core of the rule of law principle is the standard of legal certainty. Obviously, personal 
discretion must be subordinated to the general rule. This is because norms are able to negotiate 
social instructions more efficiently and in a more transparent and open way than specific legal 
measures (Scalia 1989).3  
The term of legal certainty can be reflected in a dichotomy between predictability and acceptability. 
In the first case, the term suggests clarity, consistency and predictability of law, in the second case, 
social recognition. In the first respect, legal certainty serves stability, in the second one, flexibility. 
The first aspect is of formal, the second one of material nature (Paunio 2009). In practice, legal 
certainty is an issue of barely formal requirements. The material aspects of the appreciation of 
legislation may lead to the issue of administering distributive justice.  
Paradoxically, while cohesion in law is crucial in common law jurisdictions where the state refrains 
from comprehensive intervention, and relies on the high-level abstraction of equal treatment, the 
term of legal certainty is not widely known in common law countries. Instead, they prefer simply to 
refer to the rule of law standard. According to Robert Summers (1999), the essential component of 
the rule of law is that laws should be validly made and publicly promulgated, be of general 
application, and they should be stable, clear in meaning, consistent and prospective. This is 
practically the same as the contents of the legal certainty maxim as drafted in Europe.  
In common law jurisdictions, the rule of law principle is in fact confined to its formal meaning. This 
can also be seen from the idea of Summers quoted above. Although it could be possible to argue 
that in its material sense, rule of law means that political power should be traced back to law only, 
the material considerations of the relationship between law and society could be expressed by other 
terms, such as justice and the general welfare. Rule of law simply means that law should be created 
in a correct way (Maxeiner 2006-2007). Even if the requirement of certainty in law is 
acknowledged, more emphasis is placed on rules than on principles. In the European Union, the 
principles of equal treatment, proportionality and legitimate expectations have been developed 
under the auspices of the EU Court of Justice. The result of their application is to enforce legal 
certainty.  
Under English common law, certainty in law is guaranteed first by the courts, who define and 
enforce the rights of the citizens, and secondly by the lawmaker who clearly and in advance 
prescribes which actions will be sanctioned. In the United States, the principle of the certainty of 
law is given through the “due-process” clause. There, the “vested rights” doctrine slowly evolves 
into a doctrine of the protection of legitimate expectations. In Europe, the modern concept of the 
certainty of law, as acknowledged by the EU Court of Justice, is based on the German doctrine and 
jurisprudence, defined as “Dispositionssicherheit” (Popelier 2000).  
In the ancient times, the rule of law can be identified with the services of the public good and 
justice. More importantly, the guarantee for good governance is the personality of the ruler (the 
brave prince), not the law, as it is conceived at present. A monarch may be able to resist the 
extremes in all directions, reaching the golden mean. This can only happen in an aristocratic 
political system, as Platon and Aristotle claim (Tamanaha 2004).  
3 Rightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign.  
                                                 
The rule of law is associated with the legal (formal) authority, as opposed to traditional and 
charismatic ones, and the (formal) rational legitimation of state power. This is at the time of free 
trade and political democracy where bureaucracy emerges, ensuring the formally rational operation 
of state power as described by Max Weber (Weber 1922). Broadly speaking, rule of law may come 
into force when the operation of the legal system is based on continuity, and distinction is valid and 
meaningful between rule of law as reason and rule of man as passion (Tamanaha 2004: 9).  
 
3.2. Legal positivism and natural law, rule of law and rule of reason  
Common law jurisdictions, even if legal positivism of Herbert Hart and Joseph Raz has been widely 
appreciated, are open to the non-legal layers of social conventions. Although law is conceived as a 
system of rules that are consistent with each other, it is open first because a system of precedents 
cannot be as much closed as a statutory system of law, secondly because it is not precluded that 
common law is exceptionally adjusted by equity or natural justice. Law should eventually be 
subordinate to human rights and the protection of human dignity (King 1963). From this angle, even 
radical criticism can be drafted against the products of positive law, including tax legislation.  
The strict position of legal positivism cannot be upheld in Europe either, in particular after the 
Second World War. The drama as depicted by Gustav Radbruch through the conflict-laden terms of 
“gesetzliches Unrecht” and “übergesetzliches Recht” (approximately: “being legally unjust” and 
“law beyond the scope of statutes”) was inconceivable before. Radbruch concluded that statutory 
law must be respected, but exceptionally it should be superseded by the commands of natural law. 
Hence, legal positivism must be complemented if necessary by the principles of the public good and 
justice (Radbruch 1946).4 Legal certainty has priority in the normal life. It can be superseded in 
extreme situations only. However, law cannot obtain its validity from the law itself. The core of law 
is justice, and the core of justice is in turn equality. Positive law must actually be assessed in the 
light of equality (Radbruch 1946: 108-109).  
Cicero introduces the idea that the rule of law should at the same time be the rule of reason. Law is 
eventually the manifestation of natural reason. Posited law must be subordinated to this higher layer 
of law (Tamanaha 2004: 11). Natural law reflects the social order that is emanated by the rule of 
reason. Reason is available for everyone, by means of which people are able to formulate, and can 
approximate with each other their will. The general will made by the agreements of rational agents 
may lead to freedom. This is the logic of enlightenment that has been guiding modern social 
practice to date.  
In law, the rule of reason suggests that the legal evaluation of actions can only be made properly in 
the light of specific facts and circumstances. In Community law, the restriction of one or more of 
the fundamental freedoms by Member State authorities can only be justified in the light of 
proportionality. That is, the means as chosen by the legislator should be in proportion to the 
legislative goal.  
The rule of law has traditionally been developed as a counterbalance against the arbitrary executive 
power. After the Second World War, the concept of the rule of law has been broadened. 
Constitutional courts have been established first in Germany, then in the Latin countries of Europe, 
after then in Central and Eastern Europe. The reason for this is that it is not only the executive, but 
4 “Rechtssicherheit ist nicht der einzige und nicht der entscheidende Wert, den das Recht zu verwirklichen hat. Neben 
die Rechtssicherheit treten vielmehr zwei andere Werte: Zweckmäßigkeit und Gerechtigkeit. In der Rangordnung dieser 
Werte haben wir die Zweckmäßigkeit des Rechts für das Gemeinwohl an die letzte Stelle zu setzen. Keineswegs ist 
Recht alles das, »was dem Volke nützt«, sondern dem Volke nützt letzten Endes nur, was Recht ist, was 
Rechtssicherheit schafft und Gerechtigkeit erstrebt. Die Rechtssicherheit, die jedem positiven Gesetz schon wegen 
seiner Positivität eignet, nimmt eine merkwürdige Mittelstellung zwischen Zweckmäßigkeit und Gerechtigkeit ein: sie 
ist einerseits vom Gemeinwohl gefordert, andererseits aber auch von der Gerechtigkeit.”  
                                                 
also the legislative power that must be checked from time to time (Popelier 2000: 326). This is the 
direction, from which the question of the quality of legislation can be formulated and approached. 
The abuse of monopoly power is thus not confined to the executive power. The parliamentary 
majority is willing to make an abuse of the monopoly of power in fragile democracies as well, in 
particular under populist governments.  
From a positivist perspective, legal certainty is a key term in understanding law even in America. 
The idea of law is not to administer justice, but to provide legal certainty. Law pretends to do justice 
only. It provides, however, a predictable way to decide cases. Law is (in the celebrated definition of 
Justice Holmes) “nothing more pretentious” than “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact.” 
(Rumble 1961).5 The conception of the rule of law is still not very much different, depending on 
whether interpreted from the angle of positive or natural law. On the one hand, Joseph Raz speaks 
that “the government shall be ruled by law and subject to it” and that “the creation of law […] is 
itself legally regulated” (Raz 1977; O’Donnell 2004). On the other hand, John Finnis stresses quite 
similarly, although from another theoretical direction, that the legal system is an aspect of the 
overall social order that in principle “brings definition, specificity, clarity, and thus predictability 
into human interactions” (Finnis 1980; O’Donnell 2004).  
The quality of legislation is emphasised in particular in the Benelux countries. In Belgium, 
Directives for regulations were released already in the early nineties. Citizens have the right to 
enforce the quality of legislation even before the court (Popelier 2000: 323).6 Quite similarly, in the 
Netherlands, taxpayers can challenge tax statutes without being obliged to enlist the support of an 
administrator or administrative agency in order to advance the challenge (Happé – Gribnau 2007). 
With regard to retroactive tax legislation, the State Secretary has committed himself in a 
memorandum to rules of conduct with regard to different situations where he deems retroactive tax 
legislation to be justified (Gribnau 2013).  
In Hungary, it is possible to implement self-audit concerning the interpretation of legal provisions.7 
The taxpayer may be of the opinion that the validity of the legal basis of the tax liability under audit 
can be challenged. If the payment of tax is refuted on that basis, the tax authorities are not allowed 
to determine unpaid tax or apply administrative or late payment penalties. If the tax authorities do 
not agree with the taxpayer’s position, the dispute can eventually be solved before the court.  
 
3.3. Rules and principles  
A rule is appropriate to address simple phenomena. It must be targeted at details. Principles or 
standards cover wider subjects and concern more complex issues (Braithwaite 2002). Although the 
tradition on the application of rules is very strong in certain countries (first of all the UK), currently, 
under the circumstances of the upheaval triggered by the global financial and economic crisis, it is 
all the less possible to uphold this. As the complexity, flux and the size of regulated economic 
interests increase, certainty progressively moves from being positively associated with the 
specificity of the acts mandated by rules to being negatively associated with rule specificity, as John 
5 The opposite view on law is represented by Jerome Frank (1930), not followed however by most lawyers. His thesis is 
as follows: The essence of the basic legal myth or illusion is that law can be entirely predictable. Back of this illusion is 
the childish desire to have a fixed father-controlled universe, free of chance and error due to human fallibility.  
6 Directives for Regulations (Zicht op Wetgeving), 1990-1991, 2 TK, 22, at p. 008.  
7 Under Article 124B of Act CXII of 2003 on taxation rules, as amended, the tax authorities make a review of the 
taxpayer’s self-audit within 15 days of filing the self-audit by resolution, without implementing a tax audit where the 
taxpayer files the self-audit for the sole reason that the legal rules on tax obligation would not be consistent with the 
constitution or with Community law, or the resolutions of local governments would not be consistent with other legal 
rules, provided that, until the time of filing, no decision of the Constitutional Court, the Curia or the EU Court of Justice 
has been promulgated on the question the taxpayer referred to, or the self-audit has not been consistent with the 
promulgated decisions. It is possible under the general rules of taxation to lodge an appeal to the resolution on the 
review of the self-audit or seek for a review before the court.  
                                                 
Braithwaite (2002: 52) asserts. In the arena of international business, the application of principles 
cannot be avoided either. The reason for this is that the nation state is not able to serve companies 
engaged in business, while crossing the border of national jurisdictions.  
Fiscal populism also prefers to take away rules, referring to the major ideas on non-law, like justice 
or patriotism. The vision of targeted actions to react to the changing environment of global 
economic crisis cannot bear legal considerations. The voluntarism of Robin Hood taxes and similar 
measures cannot host the discipline negotiated by the systematic application of particular rules.  
From a libertarian perspective, the rule of law suggests that the state must not interfere with the 
economy, only in the capacity of making rules. The application of principles should then be 
precluded (Hayek 1960). From a left-wing and liberal viewpoint, the state should bear responsibility 
for maintaining economic and social balance. Upon systematic intervention, principles are 
indispensable (Dworkin 1986; Braithwaite 2002: 48).  
From a very strong positivist and rule-bound viewpoint, the problem of principles like GAAR 
(general anti-avoidance rule) simply does not exist. This is characteristic for tax law scholars. 
According to them, the tax avoidance problem could in fact be reduced to that of tax expenditures. 
The whole problem could allegedly only exist because politicians want to introduce tax 
expenditures without specifically spelling out who the intended beneficiaries are, and because it 
would be politically dangerous to explicitly identify the intended beneficiary group. Hence, law 
cannot be a problem. If there are difficulties in legal application, they can be traced back to the 
deficiencies of out-of-law phenomena (Braithwaite 2002: 79).  
In the context of the theory of law and economics, Luis Kaplow contends that because rules would 
have higher promulgation costs in deciding how to craft them “ex ante”, rules should only be 
written if the law were applied frequently. Standards would have lower promulgation costs than 
rules but higher application costs (i.e., costs in determining how they should apply to specific 
situations). Hence, standards could be more economically efficient in application to arrangements 
that would arise only rarely (Braithwaite 2002: 80). In civil law countries, the application of “ex 
ante” measures seems from this logic generally to be better investment than to rely on a variety of 
“ex post” measures.  
The distinction between rules and principles must not be too rigid. One can argue that this would be 
a choice for the legislator on the surface only. Allegedly, uncertainty could not be expelled from 
rules, and principles would also hold a hard core (Schauer 2003). When authorised to act in 
accordance with rules, rule-subjects would tend to convert rules into standards by employing a 
battery of rule-avoiding devices that would serve to soften the hard edges of rules. Conversely, the 
adaptive behaviour of rule-subjects when given a standard would go in the opposite direction. These 
rule-subjects, when given few rules in the rules-standards sense, would apply them to their own 
allegedly discretionary behaviour, thus limiting significantly the case-sensitive discretion that it was 
the intention of the rule-maker to grant (Schauer 2003: 312). In the tax law practice, taxpayers are 
willing to dilute the applicable rules with a view to following tax planning strategies, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, upon the interpretation of tax law by the authorities, principles may 
receive more specific meaning, depending on special conditions.  
 
4. Proceduralisation of law  
The crisis in legislation can be imputed to the major problem that it has been all the more difficult 
to interpret material justice both in legal and non-legal environment. Unorthodoxy can precisely be 
manifested in the fact that it disregards the difficulties in interpreting justice for legal purposes at 
the time when it is also problematic to manage social welfare. As understanding proceduralisation 
of law is important for the purpose of discussing orthodoxy and unorthodoxy in law, the emerging 
importance of the form of law will be discussed below.  
 4.1. Substantive and procedural justice  
The crisis of the welfare state has been made apparent by the neoliberal economics reviving in the 
70s and 80s of the 20th century. Economist and, following them, the representatives of political and 
related sciences pointed out the relevance of the Leviathan state that would live on the surrounding 
society parasitically, and that would be lavishing and uncontrollable. The operation of a welfare 
state would be presupposed by permanent, comprehensive and systematic state intervention what 
would obviously consume much money. A consequence of this is not only the problem that the 
operation of public organs would be too expensive, but also that abundant public institutions would 
lose their authenticity. As the Leviathan would stifle healthy civic and entrepreneurial initiatives, it 
would become a major impediment to freedom.  
If the welfare state is not able to meet the actual expectations, it is not in a position either to fill its 
basic role: it does not have enough power to enforce the principles of redistributive justice. The 
latter concerns justice that is viable in practice in the instance that social welfare that is identified to 
the materialised form of happiness can be broken down into basic units of measurement and, this 
way, it is distributable among the major groups of society. This type of justice can be said to be 
substantive. That is, it relates to the merits of cases, to the essence of things. This phenomenon can 
be expressed by lawyers that the aspirations of state organs to administer justice is framed by the 
principles of substantive law (Kolm 1993). The welfare state manifests itself, e.g., in the 
introduction of progression in income tax, the organisation of regional state aid, etc.  
It is possible that one assumes fiscal policy, according to which the high-level standard of the 
equality before the law is applied to various social groups, while neglecting the real-life differences 
that otherwise exist between them. Alternatively, it is the material principle of redistribution that, 
above a certain level of richness, no state subsidy is given, while the cumulatively handicapped 
should pay no or less taxes. Substantive law occurs when, e.g., it must be determined what is the 
meaning of the right that labour must be duly compensated, or of the liability to pay tax. It is in turn 
a procedural law issue how the right to compensation can be enforced or how the liability to pay tax 
is administered. Broadly speaking, it is also of procedural law nature, or it is a question of modality 
in law, in which system of institutions the state organises itself in a certain territory at a certain time 
over a certain population, or even how the individual or normative measures of a state can be put in 
a legal order.  
The goods redistributed by the welfare state are usually exclusive. That is, the more is consumed by 
certain persons, the less remains for the rest of population. This is the product of industrial mass 
societies that can be measured by and large reliably. The value of the goods or services to be 
distributed does not depend on to whom the goods or services are provided. The reason for this is 
that in a mass society it is the material needs as well that appear in bulk. The crisis of the welfare 
state can basically be explained by the fact that there are all the more difficulties in measuring 
fundamental goods (Hayek 1974).  
One has to take into account the intellectual performance, the value of which is determined by the 
relationship that is given to the persons who acquire the product of this performance. Here, it is not 
the so-called positional goods, but the relational ones that appear. Since they are not of material 
nature, they cannot be measured either in the same way as the products of an industrial mass-
society. As a consequence, they cannot be subject to the common criteria of distributive justice 
either (Bourdieu 2007; Bruno – Zamagni 2007; Bouckaert 2007).  
Relational goods can only be enjoyed collectively in a social environment. They are not exclusive, 
or even it can occur that the more of which is consumed, the value of which becomes higher. For 
example, the student must be involved in the process of learning and teaching, the patient in the 
process of healing, and the services provided will be really valuable where interaction is developed 
between those who render, and those who receive the services in question. The private business 
advice can also be like this, and even a novel, the product of fine literature, the copy of which a 
reader purchases, but he or she may also continue the writer’s work to a certain extent, while 
enjoying it, that has already been completed on the author’s side.  
In the process of the recognition of the goods inserted into personal relationships, it is no longer a 
question what the material principles are, according to which goods can be distributed (e.g., those 
have to pay who benefit from the goods as provided or, on the contrary, it is desirable to try to 
alleviate social differences, etc.). It is important what the rules of game are, on which the 
participants of the game of distribution can agree with each other. Distributive justice can this way 
be replaced by procedural one. It is no longer needed to have a centre of power that is able to 
anticipate according to which principle the goods will be distributed. It is rather important that the 
participants contact each other, establishing a common language and an order of values that can be 
authoritative to them. Although this order of values cannot be valid, but in small groups, this is a 
means of distribution, however, that can take duly place in this environment (Hayek 1976).  
Certain groups can be developed, mainly informally, but this does not mean that they would not be 
influential. Their members rely  
- on compromises rather than on the principle of efficiency;  
- on participatory democracy rather than on the alternate party-related mechanisms of 
representative democracy; and  
- on the coherence of cohesive values that have been developed as the fruit of common 
efforts, rather than on legal certainty and the rule of law.  
This is a world which seems to be quite far from the sphere of fiscal policy. This is not true, 
however. There have been all the more examples for the growing importance of such small groups. 
They can be developed in the process of the horizontal enforcement of tax liability (Happé 2007a; 
2007b), in that of creating soft law, or in somewhere else (Gribnau 2007). Anyway, where 
taxpayers cannot be satisfied by the normal application of tax law, they seek for non-formal means 
of achieving certainty. A key to this is coherence to, not certainty of, law.  
One cannot claim that relational goods have pushed out the traditional products of labour. The 
informal communities are for the time being only to complement the extensive state administration. 
Their role is growing nevertheless in determining the quality of life. Some examples for this 
development are the following: communities of deliberate consumers, communities of users and 
developers of open-source software, etc.  
 
4.2. Transformation of substantive law into procedural one  
Procedural justice, as interpreted above, can also be manifested in legal mechanisms. By the term of 
law one can understand of course not only the direct use of the means of administrative coercion. 
For example, in the European Union, the five-six decade long development of Community law 
allows several conclusions on its nature:  
- it is autonomous;  
- it has priority over Member State law in case of conflict; and  
- its important provisions are directly applicable; that is, they are the proper means of the 
enforcement of individual rights, without being subject to application of national law.  
Interestingly, although Community law has undoubtedly become a sovereign system of law, no 
state can be discovered that would stand behind the creation of this law. This is because the 
European Union cannot be considered even as a loose form of federation.  
This law has been developed by availing itself to the “logic of Baron Münchhausen.” It has thus 
been created due to the inner force of the lawyers’ profession, more precisely, by the occasional 
communities of players in various cases. One can raise the question: which way could that happen? 
The answer to this is that Community law has been developed as a means of converting real-life 
conflicts into juridic ones, concerning which Community law is able to provide solutions, while 
Member States are powerless.  
It is characteristic for Community law that substantive and procedural laws are penetrated into each 
other. For example, the procedural law question that the public authorities of a Member State 
should initiate the exchange of information with their counterparts in another Member State must be 
assessed from the perspective of the fundamental Community freedoms (the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital). Is it important from the viewpoint of the enforceability of the 
fundamental freedoms, that the competent authorities of a Member State must initiate the exchange 
of information across borders.  
The interrelationship between the forms of substantive and procedural law is true even inversely: 
substantive law may be transformed into procedural law. The authorities of a Member State can be 
expected to apply national law not yet adapted to EU law in a “friendly enough” way until 
adaptation happens. That is, they should contribute to possibly better and better enforcement of 
fundamental freedoms. It is thus not necessary to change national law in order to solve the problem 
of citizens, provided that the public authorities change their attitude, opening doors toward the 
growing claims of their citizens. For example, the French authorities of social security cannot be 
expected to pay without deliberation the cost of a French resident who got unexpectedly sick in 
Berlin and is subject to urgent medical treatment at a hospital there. It is required, however, that the 
French authorities examine whether the medical intervention made on the spot was proper. If so, it 
is proper as well to exceptionally reimburse the affected French citizen for the cost of the German 
medical treatment.8  
In this case, harmonisation can take place bottom up, from a micro perspective. It cannot be 
achieved due to the mechanisms of official policy, but thanks to the sufficiently flexible 
management of the specific problem. The application of the statutory laws of a Member State has 
been subordinated to the standards of the equivalence of the legal systems of Member States, and 
the effectiveness in the protection of individual rights (effet utile) that are managed flexibly enough.  
In many areas, there has not been political will to approximate the laws of Member States. In the 
light of the Community freedoms developed in Community practice, the authorities of Member 
States are still expected to make it possible for the principles of Community law developed at a high 
level to be effectively enforceable in individual cases. To this end, the authorities of Member States 
should proceed in a way that the Community freedoms should not be restricted unnecessarily or in a 
non-proportionate way. It is not prescribed how these conditions must be met. They can still be read 
from the practice of the EU Court of Justice. The issue under discussion is thus not what we want, 
but that the way in which we pursue our goals. Hence, it has not actually been a substantive, but a 
procedural law problem of how to argue, and decide, in specific cases.  
 
4.3. Form and law  
Procedural justice is the consequence of the formalisation of the redistributive mechanisms of 
power. The centres of the organisation and redistribution of social production are confined to 
guarantee the operation of the transparent and predictable forums of safeguarding of interests. In 
such an environment, law has also been formalised. Namely, the legislator does not seek to allocate 
the rights and obligations that can be associated to different major social groups. It concentrates 
instead on the most effective way in which rights and obligations can be enforced that may 
otherwise be very different from each other.  
8 See the following case of the ECJ: C-56/01 Patricia Inizan, ECR 2003, p. I-12403, Para. 60.  
                                                 
Substantive law answers the question of what rights and obligation one can hold. Procedural law 
addresses the issue of how these rights and obligations can be enforced. It is a question of 
procedural law as well how law can be created. Concerning the development of law, one can 
highlight that the point of law is to formalize the contents determined by political considerations 
from outside and above the law. As it can be read on the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels, 
law is nothing else, but the will expressed by the ruling classes (Marx – Engels 1974). The 
relationship between politics and law is this way is determined by politics. The same logic can be 
found in Hungary from 2010 on in case of the Hungarian ruling party, although their representatives 
would not be willing to refer to the classics of Marxism.  
It is another possible approach to this relationship that one has to identify not law in general, but the 
right law. The validity of law can in this case be determined, depending on the fact whether the 
ways and means, in which statutory law is created are immaculate (according to Hobbes, 
“auctoritas, non veritas facit legem”; see Stammler 1926; Radbruch 1956). Consequently, it cannot 
be adjudged whether law is right, based on its contents, but on its author.9 It is important whether 
the law to be created can be smoothly placed into a given legal order, contributing to the 
consistency and integrity of the existing law.  
In the era of enlightenment, the doctrine of the division of the branches of power has been 
introduced to provide defence against the over-concentration of political power. What the individual 
can assert against excessive power is the naked form. It is not really possible to be defended, while 
being hidden behind bastions. It is not the force of administration either that can be useful, but 
barely the form as negotiated by law. In free-trade capitalism, it is common to introduce rule-
orientation, that is, to apply conceptually constructed rules through deductive logic. Later, the 
welfare state is aimed at the correction of market imperfections. Therefore, the purposive 
programmes of action come to the fore. In the postmodern era, self-generating legal systems are 
developed, while law is confined to providing offers of dispute settlements (Teubner 1983).  
Where the legal form is respected, the political contents cannot become part of law, only through 
transposal. This is for the benefit of law, and also good for society. Valuable things cannot be 
obtained by force. It is necessary to come to agreements for the purpose that, in the process of 
giving and accepting goods, the participants of a game could find and fill their own roles. The 
values that determine the quality of life are worthy to the extent that they can be put into personal 
relationships.  
Law that is designed to bridge over the differences in interests in a civilised way is able to serve 
such a process of personification, provided it is able to hold inner consistency and reflect outward 
harmony. For this purpose, law should operate in a sovereign way. If outside factors, like politics, 
interfere with law, it is mockery, or the rude forms of political will only that can be produced.  
The creation of law, including a constitution, cannot start anew each time. The law under creation is 
embedded in a legal order that has already existed. One can hardly imagine in law a case of “tabula 
rasa”. It is on the surface only that it would be possible to start from scratch. Importantly, new laws 
should be adjusted to the old ones because this is the way, in which cohesion in law can grow. This 
is the way, in which, after the changes of the political and economic system, the Republic of 
Hungary could find itself in 1989 as a successor of the People’s Republic of Hungary that existed 
before. The force inherent in continuity cannot be replaced by even the strongest political will.  
9 With Thomas Hobbes, abstraction from material justice does not lead in fact to the rule of law, but to the justification 
of the absolute monarch whose action could not allegedly be challenged by referring to material values. Therefore, one 
can argue that the impersonal mechanisms of the rule of law cannot affect the social environment favorably unless the 
monarch is bound to a social compact he or she concluded with his or her subjects. The abuse of material justice 
through unorthodoxy can also be criticized by referring to theories of skepticism, represented already in the era of 
enlightenment by David Hume.  
                                                 
The majority-holders of political power are in error, thinking about they would be able to impose 
their will by force. The influence of political power cannot be significant on a society unless its 
holders take into account the hidden, but existing barriers that arise from the social structure. For 
political power it may be highly desired to remove the barriers from the enforcement of political 
will. This is what is called voluntarism. Those who bear in mind barriers, take into account the form 
of social relations. The form, which seems to be an impediment to the direct enforcement of 
political will, is a social product that implies common wisdom. The form suggests that the social 
environment gives clear signs of society to the majority of political power: there are other players 
on the social scene as well (Fuller 1964).10  
The form implies human relationships. Those who give respect to the form work on building peace. 
Instead of focusing on irregular contents, such persons look for the subject, on which it is possible 
to agree. As seeking for the harmony and balance of society means requirements that can be met 
from case to case only, the legal form has usually to dispense with the contents that would be 
determined preliminarily. This does not mean, however, that the inner needs of harmony could be 
disregarded.  
 
5. Assessment of quality of legislation as reflected in the recent practice of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court  
The constitutional order has been in a state of flux in Hungary in the recent years. A new 
constitution (called Fundamental Law) was introduced in 2012 that has already been amended five 
times so far. It is a break with the previous constitutional order in many respects, of which, the 
following can be highlighted:  
- the Parliament readopted the essence of the transitory provisions attached to the constitution 
that were formerly repealed by the Constitutional Court;  
- the review of constitutional provisions has been explicitly restricted; and  
- the former resolutions of the Constitutional Court have lost their effect.  
The insufficiencies of the current constitutional practice can mainly be imputed to considerations of 
unorthodox legal policy. The changes in constitutional law clearly show that law has been subject to 
political discussions. These tendencies will be summarised below.  
 
5.1. Review of the transitory provisions attached to the constitution  
The Hungarian Constitutional Court is not authorised to review the constitution itself and the 
amendment of it, only in respect to the procedural requirements that concern the creation and 
promulgation of the constitution and its amendment, and are included in the constitution itself.11 
The procedural requirements on how to create or amend the constitution are determined by Article 
(S) of the Fundamental Law.12 This is the aftermath of a judgment the Constitutional Court made 
before on the annulment of the transitory provisions of the Fundamental Law.13  
10 Lon Fuller speaks about eight “desiderata”, while discussing the inner morality of law. They constitute the eight kinds 
of excellence in law that are purely based formally.  
11 Article 24 (5) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, as adopted on 25 April 2011, entered into force on 1 January 
2012, and has already been amended five times. This wording was stated by the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental 
Law, and is effective as of 1 April 2013. This restriction was in fact introduced on the occasion of the second 
Constitutional Court decision on severance payments made to public employees, in which the Court declared the 98% 
special tax unconstitutional, being inconsistent with the principle of human dignity (37/2011. (10.V.) AB).  
12 This Article addresses the following issues:  
- who, and in which way, is authorized to make a proposal for the adoption of the constitution or of its amendment;  
- what is the order of voting by which the respective proposal can be adopted;  
                                                 
 
The Constitutional Court decided, based on the proposal of the commissioner of fundamental rights 
(general ombudsman), and in favour of this proposal. The general ombudsman challenged the 
transitory provisions of the constitution.14 He was of the opinion that they contained norms that 
should have been passed in the constitution itself (examples for the norms that were included in the 
transitory provisions were: on the early resignation of judges, on the dismissal of the commissioner 
of data protection in office, on the legal status of churches, on the registration procedure upon 
elections, etc.).  
After the time the Constitutional Court annulled the transitory provisions of the constitution, the 
Parliament reassumed the incriminated provisions almost in their entirety, now integrated into the 
body of the constitution itself. The reason for this was that, according to the Parliament, the 
Constitutional Court referred to formal deficiencies only. Therefore, the Parliament was free to 
adopt the same law again.  
The Constitutional Court held that the contents of the transitory provisions attached to the 
constitution, were not in fact of transitory, but of perennial nature. At the same time, they were not 
yet part of the constitution. It was not clarified by the legislator what was in fact the scope of the 
transitory provisions, and how they were related to the constitution itself. 15  So, the transitory 
provisions attached to the constitution were declared as unconstitutional.  
The Constitutional Court confirmed that the infringement of the constitutional order on creating law 
ensues that the law under constitutional review must be annulled as unconstitutional even for lack 
of substantive unconstitutionality.16 The Constitutional Court referred to the criteria, according to 
which legal provisions could be considered as transitory. They were as follows: they were related to 
the entry of a law into force, they were of technical nature, or they served for interpretational 
purposes. 17  The Parliament interpreted the above objection as a formal one. Therefore, the 
Parliament did not feel itself prevented from readopting the major contents of the transitory 
provisions, now as part of the amended constitution.  
 
5.2. Review of constitutional provisions  
The Constitutional Court held 18 that it does not consider itself to be authorised to review the 
constitution itself unless the constitutional provisions have been adopted in a defective procedure. 
However, the Constitutional Court insists on the level the constitutional protection of rights has 
already reached. This level cannot be lowered, but exceptionally and in accordance with the 
proportionality standard. Where the Constitutional Court discovers contradictions in the 
constitutional order, or the lack of consistency with the widely accepted principles of international 
law, it is entitled, and obliged, to declare these deficiencies.19  
- which way is the president of the republic obliged to sign the constitution or its amendment as adopted; and  
- what is the way, in which the constitution or its amendment as adopted shall be promulgated.  
13 45/2012. (29.XII.) AB.  
14 There is no general ombudsman, and there are no special ombudsmen any longer in Hungary. Instead, there is just a 
single ombudsman with deputy ombudsmen (ombudswomen) without independent decision-making authority.  
15 III. 3.4, Paras 71-79.  
16 IV.1.1, Para. 95.  
17 V, Paras. 131-135.  
18 61/2011. (13.VII.) AB, Para. V.3.  
19 Para. V.6. In its concurrent opinion, István Stumpf, a member of the Constitutional Court imputes to the formal 
criteria of evaluating the constitution or its amendment less importance. For example, even if a constitutional 
amendment is based on the individual proposal of a member of the parliament – that can be criticized –, the public law 
validity of the constitutional amendment cannot be challenged solely for this reason, he argues (Para. 1). Further, 
according to him, no difference can be discovered between the constitution and its amendment. The starting point for 
constitutional review should always be the assumption that the constitution appears in a single, closed system. Where 
there conflicts between separate provisions within the constitution, they are to be solved based on the assumption that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
In this case, the Constitutional Court had to deal with the question whether, as a product of the 
amendment of the constitution, the prohibition of the Constitutional Court from the review of tax 
matters,20 and the introduction of a 98% tax on the income derived from severance payments made 
in the public sector21 are consistent with the constitution. As these measures have been directly built 
in the constitution, and they have been duly passed in a normal order, the Constitutional Court did 
not find itself competent in making a judgment on these measures.  
The Parliament had the firm intention to stop the Constitutional Court from the review of the 
constitution itself unless there are formal reasons for it. The legislator has made clear its position 
that in substantive law matters the Parliament should be sovereign. The Parliament may have 
entertained the idea that the power of the Constitutional Court in the review of the constitution 
should be severely restricted this way. The Parliament cannot be absolutely sure, however, of the 
fact that the Constitutional Court would not have obtained this way more power of review than 
envisaged. The form of law and, in particular, the formal criteria of legislation, matter.  
Formality in law suggests that there can be defects in the process of enacting law. For example, a 
law was not passed by majority voting as required, or a law was not duly signed by the president of 
republic. More importantly, contradictory or vague legal provisions are obviously defective. 
Another problem can be that the new law does not provide the addressee of law with enough time to 
make preparations, or even it is retroactive. Further, a law that is not consistent with international 
law may be invalid.  
The legislator may have taken the position that the formal criteria of legislation are subordinate, 
compared to the substantive values of policy options. According to this logic, the form of law is of 
secondary importance, compared to the content of law. This statement can be questioned, however. 
In the recent decades, formal issues of law have manifestly been appreciated.  
The Hungarian Constitutional Court can afford to find in the form of law a subordinated means of 
social control. It can also afford, however, to recognise in this form the culture of agreements that 
goes beyond politics. Then, it cannot regard the product of the will of political power that created 
the new constitution so that it would be beyond any constitutional scrutiny. Constitutional 
requirements cannot be expressed in a simple black and white way. This does not mean, however, 
that they would be of abstract nature. The solution the Constitutional Court can find in a particular 
case depends on the case itself.  
Once the Hungarian Constitutional Court is authorised to review the constitutionality of law, 
including the constitution itself, for formal, rather than for material reasons, it did not receive less, 
but more. The manner in which the constitution is created, and amended, is the essence of law. In 
any case, the basic value of European civilisation is the respect of form.  
 
5.3. Effect of the former resolutions of the Constitutional Court  
As a result of one of the reactions the Parliament made to the decisions of the Constitutional Court 
on the annulment of the above discussed transitory provisions, the constitution currently includes in 
the constitution is a single building block (Para. 2.2). Interestingly, the methodology on the possible justification of the 
restriction of fundamental rights by referring to the proportionality standard cannot be applied to the issue of the 
division of power. Consequently, the restriction of the scope of constitutional review cannot be interpreted with 
reference to the proportionality principle (Para. 2.3). The “ius cogens” evolving in international law cannot be part of 
the constitution, being a single complex. International law is superior, but it cannot be ranked on the same level as the 
constitution. A constitutional review cannot therefore be established on direct reference to international law (Para. 3). 
As the constitution must be interpreted in its entirety, constitutional provisions are to be reviewed without limitation by 
the Constitutional Court. The integrity of the constitution suggests more than the single constitutional provisions. From 
this angle, the constitutional review cannot be reduced to formal criteria (Para. 4).  
20 Sec. 32A of Act XX of 1949 on the constitution of the Republic of Hungary, repealed as of 1 January 2012.  
21 Sec. 70I (2) Act XX of 1949.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
its closing provisions that the resolutions the Constitutional Court has passed before 1 January 2012 
have lost their effect, except that the legal consequences these resolutions have elicited are not 
affected.22 As a matter of law, the Constitutional Court has been prevented from making reference 
to its former decisions. The Constitutional Court claims in a judgment,23 however, that it can benefit 
from the legal reasoning to be found in earlier decisions, provided that this exercise is consistent 
with the provisions of the constitution under review that are identical or similar to the respective 
provisions of the former constitution that was in effect before 2012.  
As the Constitutional Court argues, the national and international development of constitutional law 
may affect the interpretation of the current constitution. The Constitutional Court should be allowed 
to refer to the former resolutions of the Constitutional Court because, under the rule of law, the 
reasoning inherent in the former resolutions and the sources of constitutional law should be 
available to every citizen. Legal certainty requires that the reasoning behind the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court to be transparent, traceable and verifiable.24  
The quality of legislation is not only the matter of legislation itself, strictly speaking. The 
interpretation of laws as applied by public authorities is also important. As such interpretation must 
be consistent with statutory laws and must serve for achieving a growing level of consistency in 
law, the question of quality should refer to formal criteria. These formalities are in turn crucial for 
the operation of public authorities and the legal system of a country, in accordance with the rule of 
law principle.  
 
6. Concluding remarks concerning orthodoxy and unorthodoxy in legislation  
6.1. Orthodoxy  
To begin with explaining the orthodoxy of legislation, the rule of law principle must be referred to. 
It is the result of a break with an idea that was entertained from ancient times through the Middle 
Ages over long centuries that the guarantee for good governance would be a brave prince. Under 
the rule of law, the guarantee for the state’s smooth operation is not produced by courageous 
persons, but by the impersonal mechanism of law.  
The rule of law principle introduced in the 19th century was later on completed by the legal certainty 
principle on the European continent. The reason for this was (Harlow 2006) that it was important 
for citizens to organise themselves against the discretionary power of the public authorities (in 
France) or to secure a sufficient level of protection of fundamental rights (in Germany). After the 
Second World War, it was experienced in Europe that the abuse of power can arise not only from 
the malpractice of the executive, but also from the legislative power. This is where the question of 
the quality of legislation can be raised. It does not concern the way in which distributive justice is 
administered through the choice of substantive legal values. In this respect, the legislative power is 
recognised as sovereign. Legislation is still subject to a series of formal requirements. The point to 
them is that law should be created aptly. More closely, it may be compared to the standards of legal 
certainty, proportionality and equality.  
Standards, to which laws can be measured under orthodoxy can be formulated, based on the 
following:  
- The question of the quality of legislation is developed at the moment when it becomes 
significant to check not only the executive, but also the legislative power.  
22 Fundamental Law of Hungary (as amended), Closing provisions, Para 5.  
23 13/2013 (17.VI.) AB.  
24 13/2013 (17.VI.) AB, III, Para 33.  
                                                 
- Formality matters for the quality of legislation: formal, rather than material considerations 
carry weight: clarity, consistency and predictability are important, acceptance is not.  
- Equality versus the allocation of rights and liabilities: equality on a high level of abstraction 
and legal certainty are highlighted, in contrast to the emphasis placed on the allocation of 
rights and obligations. 
- Law, justice and equality: the core of law is justice, and the core of justice is in turn 
equality; positive law must be assessed in the light of equality.  
- Law, reason and freedom: reason is available for everyone, by means of which people are 
able to formulate, and can approximate with their wills; the general will is made by the 
agreements of rational agents and may lead to freedom.  
 
Further:  
- No protection of rights on a lower level than what has already been reached: the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court has held that it does not consider itself to be authorised to review the 
constitution itself unless the constitutional provisions have been adopted in a defective 
procedure; however, the Constitutional Court insists that the level as reached cannot be 
lowered, but exceptionally and in accordance with the proportionality standard.  
- Consistency and integrity of law: where the Constitutional Court discovers contradictions in 
the constitutional order, or the lack of consistency with the widely accepted principles of 
international law, it is entitled and obliged, in the light of protecting the integrity of the 
constitution, to declare (but not to remove) these deficiencies.  
- No direct influence of politics on law: where the legal form is respected, the political 
contents cannot become part of law, only through transposal.  
- No law without its antecedents: the law under creation is embedded in a legal order that has 
already existed; one can hardly imagine a case of “tabula rasa” in law; new law should be 
adjusted to the old ones because this is the way in which cohesion in law can grow.  
- Preference of the inner form (according to Fuller, inner morality) of law to its substance: the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court can afford to find in the form of law a subordinated means 
of social control; it can also afford, however, to recognise in this form the culture of 
consensus that goes beyond politics.  
 
6.2. Unorthodoxy  
The quality of legislation is an issue in the era of unorthodoxy because the Hungarian legislative 
power is not effectively subject to the review to be made by the Constitutional Court. The abuse of 
legislative power cannot thus be precluded. The Constitutional Court is banned from the substantive 
review of constitutional amendments, and from the review of substantive tax legislation. Besides, 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court made before the entry into force of the Fundamental Law 
have lost their legally binding nature. The legislator’s intent was to introduce a constitutional 
doctrine of discontinuity between the Fundamental Law and the former constitution. This is in 
contrast to the principle of constitutional continuity, uniformly followed for twenty years in 
Hungary after the changes of the economic and political system (Halmai – Scheppele 2013). It 
comes from the adopted doctrine of discontinuity that it is not precluded that the level of protecting 
fundamental rights can be lowered, depending on the deliberation of politically organised 
communities.  
Unorthodoxy makes use of law as an instrument of directly expressing political will. This stance on 
law is also extended to constitutional issues. It comes from these changes that the legislator 
exercises the power of constitutionalisation, not different from that of common legislation, without 
effective limits. This is all the more dangerous because a number of fundamental rights are 
restricted by the Fundamental Law itself. For example, the freedom of conscience is restricted by 
the Fundamental Law to the extent that religious belief can only be confessed in community 
through religious organisations recognised by the state. The Hungarian Parliament decides by 
political resolution whether an applicant organisation will be recognised as church or not. Truncated 
fundamental rights are not able to provide the function of serving as a standard, to which the state of 
human rights could be effectively measured. Due to imperfection of the constitutional regulation of 
human rights, it is also a question whether the Fundamental Law itself can be considered as a fully-
fledged legal document of constitutional character (Vörös 2013).  
It is crucial in a society to reach agreement concerning the way in which material justice can be 
administered. Subsidiarity is the starting point for social organisation. Then, the freedom of 
enterprise may result in increasing social differences. They must be tolerated, however, as long as 
basic liberties are given to each citizen. Unorthodoxy does concern the question of material justice. 
It does not touch upon a more fundamental layer of social life, however, making it impossible to 
achieve agreement of how disputes, if any, can be settled.  
Unorthodoxy challenges equality before the law, being critical towards mass democracies. It also 
raises doubts on the operability of the rule of law, relying on personal skills, or loyalty, rather than 
on impersonal mechanisms that might arise from the checks and balances as developed upon the 
division of political power. Unorthodox policies refer to the individual motive of acquiring as many 
material goods as possible. As a result, society will be weak in cooperation. Besides, it can happen 
that law is subordinated to political aspirations. For lack of legal suppositions, legislation suffers 
from casuistry and regulatory capture.  
The major impact of unorthodox policies on social practice is that impersonal mechanisms of 
democratic procedures and the rule of law are blurred. Instead, social relations, including even 
economic ones, are personalised. The reason for this is that, despite the fact that a society has been 
on the way of modernisation, it may remain to be weak in functional differentiation. It is then more 
than difficult to develop subsystems that would be able to follow their own deliberation. The 
spheres of social life, like economy, academia, religion, public administration or law are politicised. 
Everything will be of political importance. The micro processes of social life are not able to make 
up for missing subsystems either. Unorthodox policies are engaged in adjusting personal 
relationships, intruding on privacy. Therefore, informal communities will also be subject to political 
games.  
As a consequence of these changes, not only legislation suffers from the interference by unorthodox 
policies, but, more importantly, contractual and other horizontal relationships are also deformed by 
political aspirations. Under such circumstances, law is not able to develop itself as an order of rules 
that are consistent with each other, being integrated into a single system. Besides, for lack of 
freedom from political influence, there are no chances for contracting out of the system. The 
application of law is then unable to improve legal culture, nor support legislation.  
Unorthodox policies are inevitably bound to the current time horizon. The state is always busy with 
transforming economic and non-economic resources among selected groups that are to be protected 
against international competition by administrative measures. For lack of institutional guarantees 
for democratic decision-making, there are no limits to centralisation. Problems of imbalances can be 
managed by concentrated political power. This does not ensure survival, however. Unorthodox 
policies have to cope with problems of imbalances and look for solutions, just moving from case to 
case. In this course, political power is blind to the future.  
Irrationality undermines the chances of legislation. In successful societies, non-legal problems are 
converted into legal ones. This way, material problems cannot be solved on their merits. They can 
eventually be managed for the sake of society, however (Kelsen 1945; Ost 1988; Pound 1942).25 
Under unorthodoxy, this is inversely. Legal matters are so strongly influenced by political 
deliberation that they are converted into non-legal ones. A big disadvantage of this development is 
that social conflicts cannot be alleviated. Social practice, being subject to political actions, is 
overheated. Unexpected affections cannot be removed. In such circumstances, it is not only 
problematic that legal suppositions are squeezed out, but More importantly, it is impossible to arrive 
at sound decisions.  
All these trends of development drastically limit the chances of economic and social development in 
the near future. It is always a matter of the state’s responsibility how social differences are 
managed. A key to this is tax legislation because it contributes to the maintenance of a system of 
institutions where social production is controlled and redistribution is organised. Such institutions 
of centralisation and redistribution should be balanced and flexible enough, constituting a 
preliminary condition of the recognition of social differences. The interrelationship between 
unorthodoxy and tax legislation will be the subject of another study on unorthodox taxes that will 
follow the present one.  
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